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THE EARLY SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES IN PERSPECTIVE
On September 24, 1789, at the first session of the People
of the United States in Congress assembled, after some op-
position from South Carolina and Georgia which was vigor-
ously fought by Massachusetts, New York and Virginia
coupled with the powerful advocacy of Roger Sherman of
Connecticut, there was finally passed the Judiciary Act pro-
viding for the establishment of the Supreme Court of the
United States in accordance with Sections 1 and 2 of Article
III of the Constitution of the United States theretofore
adopted. This Act provided for a Chief Justice and five
Associate Judges. The Act of July 13, 1866, provided for
an additional Associate Justice; on April 10, 1869, Con-
gress again raised the number of Associate Justices to eight,
where it now remains, nine en banc.
Inextricably woven into the warp and woof of our na-
tional life the Supreme Court of the United States has
through the years shaped the destinies of the American
people by decisions, sometimes great, sometimes expedient,
sometimes harmful-at times strongly usurping the func-
tions of our legislative branch with "bench made law" and
at others passing weakly upon a great issue in an attempt
to evade a national debacle. How well or how ill its work
has been done remains for the historian writing in the year
3000 A. D. to say. We are too close to the picture to see
the effect of the chiaroscuro.
Even after the Supreme Court had been in operation for
years, no less a patriot and statesman than Thomas Jeffer-
son expressed at Paris a conviction that a grave mistake and
vital error had been made by the founding Fathers in the
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structure of the judicial department of our Government.
He foresaw the judicial power; installed for life, "advanc-
ing with noiseless and steady pace to . ..the annihilation
of constitutional state rights." How- clairvoyant he was
was rapidly borne out by events: the rulings of the Court be-
came political and not judicial. The alien and sedition laws
throttled the right of free speech and the Supreme Court
of the United States remained supine as to the people and
oligarchic in its views and decisions. With the coming of
Jefferson into power, however, two Supreme Court Judges
were impeached and one removed from office. Since' that
time the Court has won the general confidence of the people,
albeit from time to time, its decisions running counter to
general ideas and prejudices of large sections of our people
have caused a renewal of agitation for a general change in
our national judiciary system. However, human minds
have never been able to erect a system of government which
shall at all times be satisfactory to all men, and suffice it to
say, that it is difficult to imagine, upon what rocky shoals
we would have drifted had there been no Dartmouth College
case on the security of corporate charters; had there been no
McCullock v. Maryland on the right of a State to tax a
national agency; had there* been no Gibbons v. Ogden on
Interstate Commerce; or Brown v. Maryland and the Pas-
senger cases on foreign commerce; if there were no Craig v.
Missouri on State Bills of Credit; no Charles River Bridge
case on State Powers over Corporations; br no Slaughter-
house cases on the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment. We
hav6 seen great jurists-Jay, Marshall, Story, Taney, Chase
-who shaped and planned the scope of the far-reaching
Court. The bold and dominating Marshall, immediately
on becoming Chief Justice, establishing in Marbury v. Madi-
son that the Supreme Court held the power of declaring laws
of Congress unconstitutional and affirming that there were
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certain vested rights that no law could abolish. This was
pretty close to a recognition of "the divine right of Kings."
Considering the temper of the people after their war with
England, Marshall was not wanting in courage in inter-
preting, supporting and developing the national concentra-
tion of power so odious to Jefferson. How the Court itself
has treated this power,-whether inherent or usurped,-mis
reflected in its decisions. When necessity has later arisen,
the Court has pointed to the precedent established by Mar-
shall and has taken full cognizance of the extraordinary
functions" with which Marshall said the Court was vested.
Whether the framers of the constitution at the convention in
1787 intended that the Supreme Court pass upon the consti-
tutionality of the Acts of Congress is a moot point, the
Constitution does not specifically so provide. The Supreme
Court itself has so provided. It says it can and most of the
American people, who think about it, have come to the con-
clusibn that it can, and it does.
This does not imply that the Court has abused its power.
As early as 1798, Judge Iredell took pains to call the at-
tention of the people to the self-imposed limitation of au-
thority that has hardened into a rule of conduct for the
Court. Iredell said that as the authority to declare a statute
void "is of a delicate and awful nature, the Court will never
resort to that authority, but in a clear and urgent case."
In the long line of cases since every reasonable presumption
has been given that statutes are valid and constitutional
until the contrary is shown beyond, in the words of Judge
Strong, "a rational doubt."
There has never been since Marshall and his chief co-
adjutor Story, any Chief Justice who has achieved or even
paralleled the decisions of Marshall validating the Holland
Company and Yazoo frauds, the decision for Livingston and
Gilchrist against the Maryland Insurance Company pro-
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mulgating for the first time the extraordinary and surprising
doctrine that an insurance company ought to know that its
assured will practice deception, except Story's decision in
favor of Marshall in the Fairfax case and Story's historic
decision when attacked by four Judges for having acted un-
constitutionally in the Fairfax case, that he was the Judge
of his own actions, and that after due deliberation, Story
decided that Story had acted constitutionally.
Later came the Dartmouth College case with the decision
that corporate charters and franchises are contracts becom-
ing vested property rights and in no way subject to repeal.
This momentous decision has become the world's most fam-
ous example of judge-made constitutional law. - Swiftly fol-
lowing came the cases of McCulloch v. Maryland, Gibbons
v. Ogden annulling the rights of a State to grant a monopoly,
the decision in the "Antelope" case, by a terrific twisting of
the law and facts legalizing the traffic of the. slavers, the
validation of the Arredondo claim, and then the claim of
John Jacob Astor to the confiscated Morris lands and cul-
minating with the validation of the enormous Mitchell claim
to 1,200,000 acres in Florida.
On July 6, 1835, Marshall died at the age of eighty leav-
ing as a heritage those precedents established by him which
have become the organic principles of our law and govern-
ment and by which the 'dead hand of Marshall still rules
the decisions of our highest tribunal. President Jackson
appointed Roger B. Taney as successor to Marshall.
Taney succeeded to the bench at the moment when the
land frauds had become so fastened upon the nation that
there was a general concerted plan for the spoliation of the
national domain and for defrauding the Indians of the lands
originally owned by them or reserved to them by the- Fed-
eral Government. Without the connivance of the Supreme
Court of the United States this wholesale seizing of public
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lands was impossible. The ,State Courts continuously
handed down decisions refusing to recognize the forged
French land grants ante-dated but prepared and executed
after the Louisiana Purchase and the spurious Spanish land
grants which immediately sprang into being after the ces-
sion of Florida to the United States. But Marshall and
Story had paved the way for Taney. To Taney the opin-
ion of John Marshall was the voice of God. The land
frauds continued and "westward the course of empire took
its way."
Edward Carey Cohen.
New York.
